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Abstract
We give a review of some known published applications of quasigroups
in cryptology.
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1 Introduction
Now the theory of quasigroups applications in cryptology goes through the
period of rapid enough growth. Therefore any review of results in the given
area of researches quite quickly becomes outdated. Here we give a re-written
and supplemented form of more early versions [111, 112] of such kind of
reviews. See also [55, 123].
Almost all results obtained in the domain of quasigroups application
in cryptology and coding theory till the end of eighties years of the XX-
th century are described in [25, 26, 28]. In the present survey the main
attention is devoted to the later articles in this direction.
It is possible to find basic facts on quasigroup theory in [6, 8, 7, 102, 83,
111]. Information on basic fact in cryptology can be found in many books,
see, for example, [3, 13, 95, 96].
Cryptology is a science that consists of two parts: cryptography and
cryptanalysis. Cryptography is a science on methods of transformation (ci-
phering) of information with the purpose of this information protection from
an unlawful user. Cryptanalysis is a science on methods and ways of break-
ing down the ciphers [37].
In some sense cryptography is a ”defense”, i.e. this is a science on
construction of new ciphers, but cryptanalysis is an ”attack”, i.e. this is a
science and some kind of ”art”, a set of methods on breaking the ciphers.
This situation is similar to situation with intelligence and contr-intelligence.
These two objects (cryptography and cryptanalysis) are very close and
there does not exist a good cryptographer that does not know methods of
cryptanalysis.
It is clear, that cryptology depends on level of development of society,
of science and level of technology development.
We recall, a cipher is a way (a method, an algorithm) of information
transformation with the purpose of its defense. A key is some hidden part
(usually, a little one) or parameter of a cipher.
Steganography is a set of means and methods of hiding the fact of sending
(or passing) the information, for example, a communication or a letter. Now
there exist methods of hiddenness of the fact of information sending by usual
post, by e-mail and so on.
In this survey as Coding Theory (Code Theory) will be meant a science
on defense of information from accidental errors caused by transformation
and sending (passing) this information.
When sending the important and confidential information, as it seems
to us, there exists a sense to use methods of Code Theory, Cryptology, and
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Steganography all together [80].
In cryptology one often uses the following Kerkhoff’s (1835 - 1903) rule:
an opponent (an unlawful user) knows all ciphering procedure (sometimes a
part of plaintext or ciphertext) with exception of key.
Many authors of books, devoted to cryptology divide this science (some-
times not paying attention to this fact) in two parts: before article of Diffie
and Hellman [30] (so-called cryptology with non-public (symmetric) key)
and after this work (a cryptology with public or non-symmetric key). Prac-
tically namely Diffie and Hellman article opened new era in cryptology.
Moreover, it is possible to apply these new approaches in practice.
Especially fast development of the second part of cryptology is connected
with very fast development of Personal Computers and Nets of Personal
Computers, other electronic technical devices in the end of XX-th century.
Many new mathematical, cryptographical problems appeared in this direc-
tion and some of them are not solved. Solving of these problems have big
importance for practice.
Almost all known construction of error detecting and error correcting
codes, cryptographic algorithms and enciphering systems have made use of
associative algebraic structures such as groups and fields, see, for example,
[84, 21].
There exists a possibility to use such non-associative structures as quasi-
groups and neo-fields in almost all branches of coding theory, and especially
in cryptology.
Often the codes and ciphers based on non-associative systems show bet-
ter possibilities than known codes and ciphers based on associative systems
[28, 78].
Notice that in the last years the quantum code theory and quantum
cryptology [114, 47, 124, 14] have been developed intensively. Quantum
cryptology also use theoretical achievements of ”usual” cryptology [12].
Efficacy of applications of quasigroups in cryptology is based on the
fact that quasigroups are ”generalized permutations” of some kind and the
number of quasigroups of order n is larger than n! · (n− 1)! · ... · 2! · 1! [25].
It is worth noting that several of the early professional cryptographers,
in particular, A.A. Albert, A. Drisko, M.M. Glukhov, J.B. Rosser, E.
Scho¨nhardt, C.I. Mendelson, R. Schaufler were connected with the develop-
ment of Quasigroup Theory. The main known ”applicants” of quasigroups
in cryptology were (and are) J. Denes and A.D. Keedwell [22, 25, 26, 28, 23].
Of course, one of the most effective cipher methods is to use unknown,
non-standard or very rare language. Probably the best enciphering method
was (and is) to have a good agent.
3
2 Quasigroups in ”classical” cryptology
There exist two main elementary methods when ciphering the information.
(i). Symbols in a plaintext (or in its piece (its bit)) are permuted by
some law. The first known cipher of such kind is cipher ”Scital” (Sparta,
2500 years ago).
(ii). All symbols in a fixed alphabet are changed by a law on other letters
of this alphabet. One of the first ciphers of such kind was Cezar’s cipher
(x → x + 3 for any letter of Latin alphabet, for example a → d, b → e and
so on).
In many contemporary ciphers (DES, Russian GOST, Blowfish [95, 31])
the methods (i) and (ii) are used with some modifications.
Trithemius cipher makes use of 26×26 square array containing 26 letters
of alphabet (assuming that the language is English) arranged in a Latin
square. Different rows of this square array are used for enciphering various
letters of the plaintext in a manner prescribed by the keyword or key-phrase
[3, 65]. Since a Latin square is the multiplication table of a quasigroup, this
may be regarded as the earliest use of a non-associative algebraic structure
in cryptology. There exists a possibility to develop this direction using
quasigroup approach, in particular, using orthogonal systems of binary or
n-ary quasigroups.
R. Schaufler in his Ph.D. dissertation discussed the minimum amount
of plaintext and corresponding ciphertext which would be required to break
the Vigenere cipher (a modification of Trithemius cipher) [106]. That is, he
considered the minimum member of entries of particular Latin square which
would determine the square completely.
Recently this problem has re-arisen as the problem of determining of
so-called critical sets in Latin squares, see [67, 32, 33, 36, 35, 69]. See, also,
articles, devoted to Latin trades, for example, [5].
More recent enciphering systems which may be regarded as extension
of Vigenere’s idea are mechanical machines such as Jefferson’s wheel and
the M-209 Converter (used by U.S.Army until the early 1950’s) and the
electronically produced stream ciphers of the present day [77, 95].
During the second World War R.Shauffler while working for the German
Cryptography service, developed a method of error detection based on the
use of generalized identities (as they were later called by V.D. Belousov) in
which the check digits are calculated by means of an associative system of
quasigroups (see also [19]). He pointed out that the resulting message would
be more difficult to decode by unauthorized receiver than in the case when
a single associative operation is used for calculation [107].
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Therefore it is possible to assume that information on systems of quasi-
groups with generalized identities (see, for example, works of Yu. Movsisyan
[97] may be applied in cryptography of the present day.
Definition 2.1. A bijective mapping ϕ : g ֌ ϕ(g) of a finite group (G, ·)
onto itself is called an orthomorphism if the mapping θ : g ֌ θ(g) where
θ(g) = g−1ϕ(g) is again a bijective mapping of G onto itself. The ortho-
morphism is said to be in canonical form if ϕ(1) = 1 where 1 is the identity
element of (G, ·).
A direct application of orthomorphisms to cryptography is described in
[92, 91].
3 Quasigroup-based stream ciphers
”Stream ciphers are an important class of encryption algorithms. They
encrypt individual characters (usually binary digits) of a plaintext message
one at a time, using an encryption transformation which varies with time.
By contrast, block ciphers tend to simultaneously encrypt groups of
characters of a plaintext message using a fixed encryption transformation.
Stream ciphers are generally faster than block ciphers in hardware, and have
less complex hardware circuitry.
They are also more appropriate, and in some cases mandatory (e.g., in
some telecommunications applications), when buffering is limited or when
characters must be individually processed as they are received. Because they
have limited or no error propagation, stream ciphers may also be advanta-
geous in situations where transmission errors are highly probable” [90].
Often for ciphering a block (a letter) Bi of a plaintext the previous
ciphered block Ci−1 is used. Notice that Horst Feistel was one of the first
who proposed such method of encryption (Feistel net) [51].
In [77] (see also [78, 79]) C. Koscielny has shown how quasigroups/neo-
fields-based stream ciphers may be produced which are both more efficient
and more secure than those based on groups/fields.
In [100, 87] it is proposed to use quasigroups for secure encoding.
A quasigroup (Q, ·) and its (23)-parastrophe (Q, \) satisfy the following
identities x\(x · y) = y, x · (x\y) = y. The authors propose to use this
property of the quasigroups to construct a stream cipher.
Algorithm 3.1. Let A be a non-empty alphabet, k be a natural number,
ui, vi ∈ A, i ∈ {1, ..., k}. Define a quasigroup (A, ·). It is clear that the
quasigroup (A, \) is defined in a unique way. Take a fixed element l (l ∈ A),
which is called a leader.
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Let u1u2...uk be a k-tuple of letters from A. The authors propose the
following ciphering procedure v1 = l ·u1, vi = vi−1 ·ui, i = 2, ..., k. Therefore
we obtain the following cipher-text v1v2 . . . vk.
The enciphering algorithm is constructed in the following way: u1 =
l\v1, ui = vi−1\vi, i = 2, ..., k.
The authors claim that this cipher is resistant to the brute force attack
(exhaustive search) and to the statistical attack (in many languages some
letters meet more frequently, than other ones).
Example 3.1. Let alphabet A consists from the letters a, b, c. Take the
quasigroup (A, ·):
· a b c
a b c a
b c a b
c a b c
Then (A, \) has the following Cayley table
\ a b c
a c a b
b b c a
c a b c
Let l = a and open text is u = b b c a a c b a. Then the cipher text is v =
c b b c a a c a. Applying the decoding function on v we get b b c a a c b a = u.
Probably the cipher which is described here (Algorithm 3.1) and its
generalizations are now the most known and the most used quasigroup based
stream-ciphers.
Authors [100] say that this cipher is resistant to the brute force attack
and to the statistical one.
Cryptanalyses of Algorithm 3.1 was made by M. Vojvoda [122]. He
showed that this cipher is not resistant relatively to chosen ciphertext attack,
chosen plaintext attack and ciphertext-only attack.
We give the following 3-ary modification of Algorithm 3.1 [101]. The
possibility of such modification of Algorithm 3.1 was observed in [111].
Algorithm 3.2. Let A be a non-empty alphabet, k be a natural number,
ui, vi ∈ A, i ∈ {1, ..., k}. Define a 3-ary quasigroup (A, β). It is clear
that this quasigroup defines (4!− 1) parastrophes including (14)-, (24)- and
(34)-parastrophe.
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Take the fixed elements l1, l2, l3, l4 (li ∈ A), which are called leaders.
Let u1u2...uk be a k-tuple of letters from A. The author proposes
the following ciphering procedure v1 = β(u1, l1, l2), v2 = β(u2, l3, l4), vi =
β(ui, vi−2, vi−1), i = 3, 4, ..., k − 1. Therefore we obtain the following cipher-
text v1v2...vk.
The enciphering algorithm is constructed in the following way: u1 =
(14)β(v1, l1, l2), u2 =
(14)β(v2, l3, l4), ui =
(14)β(vi, vi−2, vi−1), i = 3, 4, ..., k −
1.
In [101] also variants of Algorithm 3.2 are given using (24)- and (34)-
parastrophes of a ternary quasigroup.
Further development of Algorithm 3.1 is presented in [54].
Definition 3.1. Let r be a positive integer. let (Q, ∗) be a quasigroup and
aj , bj ∈ Q. For each fixed m ∈ Q define first the transformation Qm : Q
r −→
Qr by
Qm(a0, a1, . . . , ar−1) = (b0, b1, . . . , br−1)⇐⇒
bi =
{
m ∗ a0; i = 0
bi−1 ∗ ai; 1 ≤ i ≤ (r − 1).
Then define R1 as composition of transformations of kind Qm, for suitable
choices of the indexes m, as follows
R1(a0, a1, . . . , ar−1) = Qa0(Qa1 . . . (Qar−1(a0, a1, . . . , ar−1))).
Definition 3.2. [54] (Shapeless quasigroup) A quasigroup (Q, ∗) of order n
is said to be shapeless if it is non-commutative, non-associative, it does not
have neither left nor right unit, it does not contain proper subquasigroups,
and there is no k < 2n for which are satisfied the identities of the kinds:
x ∗ (x . . . x ∗ (x(x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
∗y)) = y; y = ((y ∗ x) ∗ . . . ) ∗ x) ∗ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
(1)
Remark 3.1. Condition k < 2n for identities (1) means that any left and
right translation of quasigroup (Q, ∗) should have the order k ≥ (2n+ 1).
In [54] it is proposed to construct shapeless quasigroups using transversal
approach [58]. Simple quasigroups without subquasigroups and with identity
automorphism group are studied in [82, 75, 64, 110].
In the article [53] it is proposed a block cipher based on Algorithm 3.1.
Let (Q, ∗) be a quasigroup of finite order 2d. Using the operation ∗ authors
define the following vector valued Boolean function (v.v.b.f.) a ∗ b = c ⇔
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∗vv(x1, x2, ..., xd, y1, y2, ..., yd) = (z1, z2, ..., zd), where x1...xd, y1...yd, z1...zd
are binary representations of a, b, c respectively.
Each element zi depends on the bits x1, x2, ..., xd, y1, y2, ..., yd and is
uniquely determined by them. So, each zi can be seen as a 2d-ary Boolean
function zi = fi(x1, x2, ..., xd, y1, y2, ..., yd), where fi : {0, 1}
2d → {0, 1}
strictly depends on, and is uniquely determined by ∗.
Authors state that for every quasigroup (Q, ∗) of order 2d and for each
bijection Q → {0, 1..., 2d − 1} there are a uniquely determined v.v.b.f. ∗vv
and d uniquely determined 2d-ary Boolean functions f1, f2, ..., fd such that
for each a, b, c ∈ Q
a ∗ b = c⇔ ∗vv(x1, ..., xd, y1, ..., yd) =
(f1(x1, ..., xd, y1, ..., yd), ..., fd(x1, ..., xd, y1, ..., yd)).
Each k-ary Boolean function f(x1, ..., xk) can be represented in a unique
way by its algebraic normal form (ANF), i.e., as a sum of products
ANF (f) = α0 +
k∑
i=1
αixi +
k∑
1≤i≤j≤k
αi,jxixj +
k∑
1≤i≤j≤s≤k
αi,j,sxixjxs + ...,
where the coefficients α0, αi, αi,j, ... are in the set {0, 1} and the addition
and multiplication are in the field GF (2).
The ANFs of the functions fi give information about the complexity of
the quasigroup (Q, .) via the degrees of the Boolean functions fi. The
degrees of the polynomials ANF (fi) rise with the order of the quasigroup.
In general, for a randomly generated quasigroup of order 2d, d ≥ 4, the
degrees are higher than 2.
Definition 3.3. A quasigroup (Q, ∗) of order 2d is called Multivariate
Quadratic Quasigroup (MQQ) of type Quadd−kLink if exactly d − k of the
polynomials fi are of degree 2 (i.e., are quadratic) and k of them are of
degree 1 (i.e., are linear), where 0 ≤ k < d [53].
Authors prove the following
Theorem 3.1. Let A1 = [fij ] and A2 = [gij ] be two d×d matrices of linear
Boolean expressions, and let b1 = [ui] and b2 = [vi] be two d × 1 vectors of
linear or quadratic Boolean expressions. Let the functions fij and ui depend
only on variables x1, ..., xd, and let the functions gij and vi depend only on
variables xd+1, ..., x2d. If Det(A1) = Det(A2) = 1 in GF (2) and if
A1 · (xd+1, ..., x2d)
T + b1 ≡ A2 · (x1, ..., xd)
T + b2
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then the vector valued operation ∗vv(x1, ..., x2d) = A1 · (xd+1, ..., x2d)
T + b1
defines a quasigroup (Q, ∗) of order 2d that is MQQ [53].
The authors researched the existence of MQQ of order 8, 16 and 32.
Problem 3.1. Finding MQQs of orders 2d, d ≥ 6 the authors consider as
an open research problem.
Authors show that the proposed cipher is resistant relatively to the cho-
sen plain-text attack, attacks with differential cryptanalysis, XL attack,
Grobner basis attacks and some other kind of attacks.
Algebraic cryptanalysis of MQQ public key cryptosystem is given in [93]:
”... we present an efficient attack of the multivariate Quadratic Quasigroups
(MQQ) cryptosystem. Our cryptanalysis breaks MQQ cryptosystems by
solving systems of multivariate quadratic polynomial equations using a mod-
ified version of the MutantXL algorithm”.
In order to make Algorithm 3.1 more complicate and quite fast we pro-
pose the following
Procedure 3.1. Let A be a non-empty alphabet, k be a natural number,
ui, vi ∈ A, i ∈ {1, ..., k}. Define a system of n n-ary orthogonal operations
(A, fi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We propose the following ciphering procedure vi =
fi(u1, u2, . . . , un), i = 1, 2, ..., n. Therefore we obtain the following cipher-
text v1v2...vn.
The enciphering algorithm is based on the fact that orthogonal system of
n n-ary operations 

f1(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = a1
f2(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = a2
. . .
fn(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = an
has a unique solution for any tuple of elements a1, . . . , an.
Notice that we can take as a system of orthogonal n-ary operations a set
of orthogonal n-quasigroups [117, 118, 44].
Of course this choice does not make Procedure 3.1 more safe, but it gives
a possibility to use Algorithm 3.2 and Procedure 3.1 together on the base
of the same quasigroup system.
Probably there exists a sense to use in Algorithm 3.2 the irreducible
3-ary or 4-ary finite quasigroup [1, 2].
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4 Some applications of quasigroup-based stream ciphers
In [100] (see also [87]) it is proposed to use Algorithm 3.1 for secure encoding
of file system. A survey of security mechanisms in mobile communication
systems is in [120].
SMS (Short Message Service) messages are sometimes used for the in-
terchange of confidential data such as social security number, bank account
number, password etc. A typing error in selecting a number when sending
such a message can have severe consequences if the message is readable to
any receiver.
Most mobile operators encrypt all mobile communication data, including
SMS messages. But sometimes, when encrypted, the data is readable for
the operator.
Among others these needs give rise for the need to develop additional
encryption for SMS messages, so that only accredited parties are able to be
engaged in a communication. In [60] an approach to this problem using Al-
gorithm 3.1 is described. In [61] differential cryptanalysis of the quasigroup
cipher is given. Definition of the encryption method is presented.
In [87] the authors introduce a stream cipher with almost public key,
based on quasigroups for defining suitable encryption and decryption. They
consider the security of this method. It is shown that the key (quasigroups)
can be public and still has sufficient security. A software implementation is
also given.
In [81] a public-key cryptosystem, using generalized quasigroup-based
streamciphers is presented. It is shown that such a cryptosystem allows
one to transmit securely both a cryptogram and a secret portion of the
enciphering key using the same insecure channel. The system is illustrated
by means of a simple, but nontrivial, example.
5 Neo-fields and left neo-fields
A left neo-field (N,+, ·) of order n consists of a set N of n symbols on which
two binary operations ”+” and ”·” are defined such that (N,+) is a loop,
with identity element, say 0. (N\{0}, ·) is a group and the operation ”·”
distributes from the left over ”+”. (That is, x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z for all
x, y, z ∈ N .) If the right distributive law also holds, the structure is called
a neofield.
A left neofield (or neofield) whose multiplication group is (G, ·) is said
to be based on that group. Clearly, every left neofield based on an abelian
group is a neofield. Also, a neofield whose operation of addition satisfies the
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associative law is a field.
In [28, 27] some cryptological applications of neo-fields and left neo-fields
are described.
6 On one-way function
A function F : X → Y is called one-way function, if the following conditions
are fulfilled:
• there exists a polynomial algorithm of calculation of F (x) for any
x ∈ X;
• there does not exist a polynomial algorithm of inverting of the function
F , i.e. there does not exist any polynomial time algorithm for solving
the equation F (x) = y relatively variable x.
It is proved that the problem of existence of one-way function is equiva-
lent to well known problem of coincidence of classes P and NP.
One of better candidates to be an one-way function is so-called function
of discrete logarithms [83].
A neofield (N,+, ·) of order n consists of a set N of n symbols on which
two binary operations ”+” and ”·” are defined such that (N,+) is a loop
with identity element, say 0, (N\{0}, ·) is a group and the operation ”·”
distributes from the left and right over ”+” [28].
Let (N,+, ·) be a finite Galois field or a cyclic ((N\{0}, ·) is a cyclic
group) neofield. Then each non-zero element u of the additive group or loop
(N,+) can be represented in the form u = aν , where a is a generator of the
multiplication group (N\{0}, ·). ν is called the discrete logarithm of u with
base a, or, sometimes, the exponent or index of u.
Given ν and a, it is easy to compute u in a finite field, but, if the order of
the finite field is a sufficiently large prime p and also is appropriately chosen
it is believed to be difficult to compute ν when u (as a residue modulo p)
and a are given.
In [28] discrete logarithms are studied over a cyclic neofield whose addi-
tion is a CI-loop.
In [83] the discrete logarithm problem for the group RLn of all row-
Latin squares of order n is defined (p.103) and, on pages 138 and 139, some
illustrations of applications to cryptography are given.
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7 On hash function
In [46, 45] an approach for construction of hash function using quasigroups
is described.
Definition 7.1. A function H() that maps an arbitrary length message M
to a fixed length hash value H(M) is a OneWay Hash Function (OWHF),
if it satisfies the following properties:
1. The description of H() is publicly known and should not require any
secret information for its operation.
2. Given M , it is easy to compute H(M).
3. Given H(M) in the rang of H(), it is hard to find a message M for
given H(M), and givenM and H(M), it is hard to find a message M0(6= M)
such that H(M0) = H(M).
Definition 7.2. A OneWay Hash Function H() is called Collision Free
Hash Function (CFHF), if it is hard to find two distinct messages M and
M0 that hash to the same result (H(M) = H(M0))[46, 45].
We give construction of hashing function based on quasigroup [46].
Definition 7.3. Let HQ() : Q −→ Q be projection defined as
HQ(q1q2 . . . qn) = ((. . . (a ⋆ q1) ⋆ q2 ⋆ . . . ) ⋆ qn (2)
Then HQ() is said to be hash function over quasigroup (Q; ⋆). The element
a is a fixed element from Q.
Example 7.1. Multiplication in the quasigroup (Q, ⋆) is defined in the
following manner: a⋆b = (a−b) (mod 4). This quasigroup has the following
multiplication table:
⋆ 0 1 2 3
0 0 3 2 1
1 1 0 3 2
2 2 1 0 3
3 3 2 1 0
Value of hash function is H2(0013) = (((2 ⋆ 0) ⋆ 0) ⋆ 1) ⋆ 3 = 2.
Remark 7.1. There exists a possibility to apply n-ary quasigroup approach
to study hash functions of such kind. Since, in fact, equality (2) defines an
n-ary operation.
Remark 7.2. We notice, safe hash function must have at least 128-bit
image, i.e. HQ(q1q2 . . . qn) must consist of at least 128-digit number [96].
In [121, 122] hash functions, proposed in [46, 45], are discussed. The
author shows that for some types of quasigroups these hash functions are
not secure.
From [86] we give the following summary: “In this paper we consider
two quasigroup transformations QM1: A2m → A2m and QM2: Am → A2m,
where A is the carrier of a quasigroup. Based on these transformations we
show that different kinds of hash functions can be designed with suitable
security.”
Further development of quasigroup based on hash function is reflected
in [116].
In [105] on Algorithm 3.1 based on encrypter that has good scrambling
properties is proposed.
8 CI-quasigroups and cryptology
In [28, 56] some applications of CI-quasigroups in cryptology with non-sym-
metric key are described.
Definition 8.1. Suppose that there exists a permutation J of the elements
of a quasigroup (Q, ◦) such that, for all x, y ∈ Q
Jr(x ◦ y) ◦ Jsx = J ty,
where r, s, t are integers. Then (Q, ◦) is called an (r, s, t)-inverse quasigroup
([72]).
In the special case when r = t = 0, s = 1, we have a definition of
CI-quasigroup.
Example 8.1. A CI-quasigroup can be used to provide a one-time pad for
key exchange (without the intervention of a key distributing centre) [28, 68].
The sender S, using a physical random number generator (see [78] on ran-
dom number generator based on quasigroups), selects an arbitrary element
c(u) of the CI-quasigroup (Q, ◦) and sends both c(u) and enciphered key (mes-
sage) c(u)◦m. The receiver R uses this knowledge of the algorithm for obtain-
ing Jc(u) = c(u+1) from c(u) and hence he computes (c(u) ◦m) ◦ c(u+1) = m.
Example 8.2. We can propose the following application of rst-inverse quasi-
groups in situation similar to situation described in Example 8.1. It is pos-
sible to re-write definitive equality of rst-inverse quasigroup in the following
manner Jr(Jku ◦m) ◦ Js+ku = J tm.
Then the schema of the previous example can be re-written in the fol-
lowing manner. The sender S selects an arbitrary element Jku of the
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rst-quasigroup (Q, ◦) and sends both Jku and enciphered key (message)
Jr(Jku◦m). The receiver R uses this knowledge of the algorithm for obtain-
ing Jk+s(u) from Jk(u) and hence he computes Jr(Jku ◦m) ◦ Js+ku = J tm
and after this he computes the message m. Of course this example can be
modified.
Example 8.3. [28]. Take a CI-quasigroup with a long inverse cycle
(c c′ c′′ . . . ct−1) of length t. Suppose that all the users Ui (i = 1, 2, . . . )
are provided with apparatus (for example, a chip card) which will compute
a◦b for any given a, b ∈ Q. We assume that only the key distributing centre
has a knowledge of the long inverse cycle which serves as a look-up table for
keys.
Each user Ui has a public key ui ∈ Q and a private key Jui, both supplied
in advance by the key distributing centre. User Us wishes to send a message
m to user Ut. He uses Ut’s public key ut to compute ut ◦m and sends that
to Ut. Ut computes (ut ◦m) ◦ Jut = m.
Remark 8.1. It is not very difficult to understand that opponent which
knows the permutation J may decipher a message encrypted by this method.
Remark 8.2. There exists a possibility to generalize Example 8.3 using
some m-inverse quasigroups [71], or (r, s, t)-inverse quasigroups [72, 73], else
(α, β, γ)-inverse quasigroups [74].
9 Critical sets and secret sharing systems
Definition 9.1. A critical set C in a Latin square L of order n is a set
C = {(i; j; k) | i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}} with the following two properties:
(1) L is the only Latin square of order n which has symbols k in cell
(i, j) for each (i; j; k) ∈ C;
(2) no proper subset of C has property (1) [83].
A critical set is called minimal if it is a critical set of smallest possible
cardinality for L. In other words a critical set is a partial Latin square which
is uniquely completable to a Latin square of order n.
If the scheme has k participants, a (t, k)-secret sharing scheme is a system
where k pieces of information called shares or shadows of a secret key K are
distributed so that each participant has a share such that
(1) the key K can be reconstructed from knowledge of any t or more
shares;
(2) the key K cannot be reconstructed from knowledge of fewer than t
shares.
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Such systems were first studied in 1979. Simmons [115] surveyed various
secret sharing schemes. Secret sharing schemes based on critical sets in
Latin squares are studied in [17]. We note, critical sets of Latin squares give
rise to the possibilities to construct secret-sharing systems.
Critical sets of Latin squares were studied in sufficiently big number of
articles. We survey results from some of these articles. In [34] the spectrum
of critical sets in Latin squares of order 2n is studied. The paper [30] gives
constructive proofs that critical sets exist for all sizes between [n2/4] and
[(n2 − n)/2], with the exception of size n2/4 + 1 for even values of n.
For Latin squares of order n, the size of a smallest critical set is denoted
by scs(n) in [15]. The main result of [15] is that scs(n) ≥ n⌊12(log n)
1/3⌋ for
all positive integers n.
In [63] the authors show that any critical set in a Latin square of order
n ≥ 7 must have at least ⌊7n−
√
n−20
2 ⌋ empty cells. See, also, [62].
The paper [33] contains lists of (a) theorems on the possible sizes of
critical sets in Latin squares of order less than 11, (b) publications, where
these theorems are proved, (c) concrete examples of such type of critical
sets. In [36] an algorithm for writing any Latin interchange as a sum of
intercalates is corrected.
In [59] the author proposes a greedy algorithm to find critical sets in
Latin squares. He applies this algorithm to Latin squares which are abelian
2-groups to find new critical sets in these Latin squares. The critical sets
have the nice property that they all intersect some 2× 2 Latin subsquare in
a unique element so that it is easy to show the criticality.
In [4] the author gives an example of a critical set of size 121 in the
elementary abelian 2-group of order 16.
In [94] critical sets of symmetric Latin squares are studied. Therefore the
authors require all elements in their critical sets and uniquely completable
partial Latin squares to lie on or above the main diagonal. For n > 2, a
general procedure is given for writing down a uniquely completable partial
symmetric 2n× 2n Latin square L′2n containing n
2−n+2 entries, of which
2n − 2 are identical and lie on the main diagonal.
Paper [32] presents a solution to the interesting combinatorial problem
of finding a minimal number of elements in a given Latin square of odd order
n by which one may restore the initial form of this square. In particular,
it is proved that in every cyclic Latin square of odd order n the minimal
number of elements equals to n(n− 1)/2.
Surveys on critical sets of Latin squares are given in [67, 69]. See, also,
[70].
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The concept of Latin trades is closely connected with the concept of
critical set in Latin squares. Let T be a partial Latin square and L be a
Latin square with T ⊆ L. We say that T is a Latin trade if there exists a
partial Latin square T ′ with T ′ ∩ T = ∅ such that (L \ T ) ∪ T ′ is a Latin
square. Information on Latin trades is in [16].
Remark 9.1. See also Introduction for other application of critical sets of
Latin squares in cryptology.
”For a given triple of permutations T = (α, β, γ) the set of all Latin
squares L such that T is its autotopy is denoted by LS(T ). The cardinality
of LS(T ) is denoted by ∆(T ). Specifically, the computation of ∆(T ) for
any triple T is at the moment an open problem having relevance in secret
sharing schemes related to Latin squares” [49, 50].
10 Secret sharing systems and other algebraic systems
Some secret-sharing systems are pointed in [26]. One of such systems is the
Reed-Solomon code over a Galois field GF [q] with generating matrix C(aij)
of size k× (q − 1), k ≤ q − 1. The determinant formed by any k columns of
G is a non-zero element of GF [q]. The Hamming distance d of this code is
maximal (d = q − k) and any k from q − 1 keys unlock the secret.
In [9] an approach to some Reed-Solomon codes as a some kind of or-
thogonal systems of n-ary operations is developed.
In [10] general approach to construction of secret sharing systems using
some kinds of orthogonal systems of n-ary operations is given. Transforma-
tions of orthogonal systems of n-ary operations are studied in [11].
We give the summary from [52] : ”We investigate subsets of critical sets
of some Youden squares in the context of secret-sharing schemes. A subset
C of a Youden square is called a critical set if C can be uniquely completed
to a Youden square but no proper subset of C has a unique completion to a
Youden square.”
”That part of a Youden square Y which is inaccessible to subsets of a
critical set C of Y , called the strongbox of C, may be thought to contain
secret information. We study the size of the secret. J. R. Seberry and A. P.
Street [108] have shown how strongboxes may be used in hierarchical and
compartmentalized secret-sharing schemes.”
11 Row-Latin squares based cryptosystems
A possible application in cryptology of Latin power sets is proposed in [29].
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In [23] an encrypting device is described, based on row-Latin squares
with maximal period equal to the Mangoldt function.
In our opinion big perspectives has an application of row-Latin squares
in various branches of contemporary cryptology (”neo-cryptology”).
In [83] it is proposed to use: 1) row-Latin squares to generate an open
key; 2) a conventional system for transmission of a message that is the form
of a Latin square; 3) row-Latin square analogue of the RSA system; 4)
procedure of digital signature based on row-Latin squares.
Example 11.1. Let
L =
2 3 4 1
4 1 3 2
3 2 4 1
4 3 1 2
Then
L7 =
4 1 2 3
4 1 2 3
3 2 4 1
3 4 2 1
L3 =
4 1 2 3
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
3 4 2 1
Then
L21 =
2 3 4 1
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
4 3 1 2
is a common key for a user A with the key L3 and a user B with the key L7.
A public-key cryptosystem, using generalized quasigroup-based stream-
ciphers, as it has been noticed earlier, is presented in [81].
12 NLPN sequences over GF[q]
Non-binary pseudo-random sequences over GF[q] of length qm−1 called PN
sequences have been known for a long time [57]. PN sequences over a finite
field GF[q] are unsuitable directly for cryptology because of their strong
linear structure [78]. Usually PN sequences are defined over a finite field
and often an irreducible polynomial for their generation is used.
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In article [78] definition of PN sequence was generalized with the purpose
to use these sequences in cryptology.
We notice, in some sense ciphering is making a “pseudo-random se-
quence” from a plaintext, and cryptanalysis is a science how to reduce a
check of all possible variants (cases) by deciphering of some ciphertext.
These new sequences were called NLPN-sequences (non-linear pseudo-
noise sequences). C. Koscielny proposed the following method for construc-
tion of NLPN-sequences.
Let −→a be a PN sequence of length qm − 1 over GF[q], q > 2, i.e.
−→a = a0a1 . . . aqm−2.
Let −→a i be its cyclic i places shifted to the right. For example
−→a 1 = a1 . . . aqm−2a0.
Let Q = (SQ, ·) be a quasigroup of order q defined on the set of elements of
the field GF[q].
Then
−→
b = −→a · −→a i, −→c = −→a i · −→a , where bj = aj · aij , cj = a
i
j · aj for any
suitable value of index j (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qm− 1}) are called NLPN sequences
[78].
NLPN sequences have much more randomness than PN sequences. As
notice C. Koscielny the method of construction of NLPN sequences is espe-
cially convenient for fast software encryption. It is proposed to use NLPN
sequences by generation of keys. See also [76].
13 Authentication of a message
By authentication of message we mean that it is made possible for a receiver
of a message to verify that the message has not been modified in transit, so
that it is not possible for an interceptor to substitute a false message for a
legitimate one.
By identification of a message we mean that it is made possible for the
receiver of a message to ascertain its origin, so that it is not possible for an
intruder to masquerade as someone else.
By non-repudiation we mean that a sender should not be able later to
deny falsely that he had sent a message.
In [28] some quasigroup approaches to problems of identification of a
message, problem of non-repudiation of a message, production of dynamic
password and to digital fingerprinting are discussed. See also [18].
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In [27] authors suggested a new authentication scheme based on quasi-
groups (Latin squares). See also [26, 28, 20]
In [104] several cryptosystems based on quasigroups upon various com-
binatorial objects such as orthogonal Latin squares and frequency squares,
block designs, and room squares are considered.
Definition 13.1. Let 2 ≤ t < k < v. A generalized S(t, k, v) Steiner system
is a finite block design (T,B) such that (1) |T | = v; (2) B = B′ ∪B′′, where
any B′ ∈ B′, called a maximal block, has k points and 2 ≤ |B′′| < k for any
B′′ ∈ B′′, called a small block; (3) for any B′′ ∈ B′′ there exists a B′ ∈ B′
such that B′′ ⊆ B′; (4) every subset of T with t elements not belonging to
the same B′′ ∈ B′′ is contained in exactly one maximal block.
In [89] (see also [48]) an application of generalized S(t, k, v) Steiner sys-
tems in cryptology is proposed, namely, it is introduced a new authentication
scheme based on the generalized Steiner systems, and the properties of such
scheme are studied in the generalized affine planes.
14 Zero knowledge protocol
In [103] Rivest introduced All-Or-Nothing (AON) encryption mode in order
to devise means to make brute-force search more difficult, by appropriately
pre-processing a message before encrypting it. The method is general, but it
was initially discussed for block-cipher encryption, using fixed-length blocks.
It is an unkeyed transformation, mapping a sequence of input blocks
(x1, x2, . . . , xs) to a sequence of output blocks (y1, y2, . . . , yt) having the
following properties:
Having all blocks (y1, y2, . . . , yt) it is easy to compute (x1, x2, . . . , xs).
If any output block yj is missing, then it is computationally infeasible
to obtain any information about any input block xJ .
The main idea is to preserve a small-length key (e.g. 64-bit) for the main
encryption that can be handled by special hardware with not enough pro-
cessing power or memory. This gives the method a strong advantage, since
we can have strong encryption for devices that have minimum performance.
Several transformation methods have been proposed in the literature for
AON. In the article [88] it is proposed a special transform which is based on
the use of a quasigroup (it is used in algorithm 3.1).
In [24] it is proposed to use isotopy of quasigroups in zero knowledge
protocol.
Assume the users (u1, u2, ..., uk) form a network. The user ui has public-
key Lui , L
′
ui (denotes two isotopic Latin squares of order n) and secret-key
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Iui (denotes the isotopism of Lui upon L
′
ui). The user ui wants to prove
identity for uj but he doesn’t want to reveal the secret-key (zero-knowledge
proof).
1. ui randomly permutes Lui to produce another Latin square H.
2. ui sends H to uj .
3. uj asks ui either to:
a. prove that H and L
′
ui are isotopic,
b. prove that H and Lui are isotopic.
4. ui complies. He either
a. proves that H and L
′
ui are isotopic,
b. proves that H and Lui are isotopic.
5. ui and uj repeat steps 1. through 4. n times.
Remark 14.1. In the last procedure it is possible to use isotopy of n-ary
groupoids.
15 Hamming distance between quasigroups
The following question is very important by construction of quasigroup based
cryptosystems: how big is the distance between different binary or n-ary
quasigroups? Information on Hamming distance between quasigroup oper-
ation is in the articles [41, 42, 39, 38, 40, 43, 119].
We recall, if α and β are two n-ary operations on a finite set Ω, then the
Hamming distance of α and β is defined by
dist(α, β) = |{(u1, . . . , un) ∈ Ω
n : α(u1, . . . , un) 6= β(u1, . . . , un)}|.
The author in [41] discusses Hamming distances of algebraic objects with
binary operations. He also explains how the distance set of two quasigroups
yields a 2-complex, and points out a connection with dissections of equilat-
eral triangles.
For a fixed group (G, ◦), δ(G, ◦) is defined to be the minimum of all such
distances for (G, ⋆) not equal to (G, ◦) and ν(G, ◦) the minimum for (G, ⋆)
not isomorphic to (G, ◦).
In [38] it is proved that δ(G, ◦) is 6n − 18 if n is odd, 6n − 20 if (G, ◦)
is dihedral of twice odd order and 6n− 24 otherwise for any group (G, ◦) of
order greater than 50. In [119] it is shown that δ(G, ◦) = 6p− 18 for n = p,
a prime, and p > 7.
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In the article [39] there are listed a number of group orders for which
the distance is less than the value suggested by the above theorems. New
results obtained in this direction are in [43].
16 Generation of quasigroups for cryptographical needs
Important cryptographical problem is a generation of ”big” quasigroups
which it is possible to keep easily in a compact form in computer memory.
It is clear that for this aims the most suitable is a way to keep a little base
and some procedures of obtaining a necessary element.
Therefore we should have easily generated objects (cyclic group, abelian
group, group), fast and complicate methods of their transformation (paras-
trophy, isotopy, isostrophy, crossed isotopy [109], homotopy, generalized iso-
topy), their glue and blowing (direct product, semi-direct product, wreath
product [66], crossed product, generalized crossed product). For these aims
various linear quasigroups (especially n-ary quasigrous) are quite suitable
[7, 85, 113].
In [99] the boolean function is proposed to use by construction of n-ary
and binary quasigroups.
A method of generating a practically unlimited number of quasigroups of
an arbitrary (theoretically) order using the computer algebra system Maple
7 is presented in [79].
This problem is crucial to cryptography and its solution permits to im-
plement practical quasigroup-based endomorphic cryptosystems.
In this article [79] it is proposed to use isotopy of quasigroups and di-
rect products of quasigroups. If we start from class of finite groups, then,
using these ways, it is possible to obtain only class of quasigroups that are
isotopic to groups. We notice, there exists many quasigroups (especially of
large order) that are not isotopic to a group. Therefore for construction
of quasigroups that are not isotopic to groups probably better to use the
concept of gisotopy [98, 113].
17 Conclusion remarks
In many cases in cryptography it is possible to change associative systems
by non-associative ones and practically in any case this change gives in
some sense better results than use of associative systems. Quasigroups in
spite of their simplicity, have various applications in cryptology. Many new
cryptographical algorithms can be formed on the basis of quasigroups.
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